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Why Bother with Academic Freedom? 
Robert Post* 
It is a wicked pleasure to read Versions of Academic Freedom.  The 
field of academic freedom is presently rife with controversy and debate.  
There are endless animated controversies about its meaning and 
requirements.  Much of the debate is sheer foolishness, and no one is better 
at exposing its absurdity than Stanley Fish.  His book is a page-turner, filled 
with fresh new material and forceful, evocative analysis. It is both 
entertaining and educational. 
I should say at the outset that I largely agree with the thrust of Fish’s 
thesis.  Like Fish, I believe that academic freedom exists to protect the 
ability of academics to pursue their professional tasks.1 Academic freedom 
does not concern human freedom generally, but rather the autonomy of the 
scholarly profession. This simple premise is sufficient to cut through much 
of the bluster that envelops so many modern disputes about academic 
freedom. 
Although Versions of Academic Freedom is an able and reliable guide 
to the current landscape of academic freedom, I know that I have been 
invited to this symposium not merely to praise Fish, but also to engage with 
him.  And to that end I shall make three simple points about salient 
limitations in Fish’s analysis. 
The first concerns the function of the concept of academic freedom.  
Throughout Versions of Academic Freedom, Fish assumes that claims of 
academic freedom are properly addressed to those within the scholarly 
profession, and this leads him to the disconcerting conclusion that academic 
freedom can never be justified in terms of goods that exist outside of 
professional scholarship.  Fish believes that this conclusion distinguishes 
his “it’s just a job” school of academic freedom from the “for common 
good” school of academic freedom, with which I would be associated.2  But 
I believe that because Fish is wrong about the function of the concept of 
academic freedom, his conclusion about the appropriate justifications for 
 
 * Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1 The content of my views may be found in ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012) 
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY]; MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009) [hereinafter FOR THE COMMON GOOD]; Robert 
C. Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (Beshara 
Doumani ed., 2006) [hereinafter Structure]. 
2 See FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 1. 
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academic freedom is misplaced. 
My second point follows from the first.  If Fish believes that academic 
freedom can never be justified in terms of values that are external to the 
academic enterprise, than he must rule out all constitutional understandings 
of academic freedom.  Such understandings must necessarily be justified in 
terms of constitutional values, which must be determined from the external 
perspective of the Constitution, not from the internal perspective of the 
scholarly profession. For this reason, Versions of Academic Freedom can 
have very little to say about constitutional principles of academic freedom. 
My third point is that defining the content of academic freedom by 
reference to the professional practices of scholars means that one must have 
a comprehensive and catholic view of these practices.  It is important to 
Fish, as it is to any student of academic freedom, to be able to identify those 
who have abandoned these practices for the lure of political engagement.  In 
Versions of Academic Freedom, Fish proposes criteria for distinguishing 
scholarship from politics in ways that fail to account for the breadth and 
diversity of the scholarly practices that actually characterize the modern 
university. 
I. 
Versions of Academic Freedom embraces what Fish calls the “It’s just 
a job” school of academic freedom.  This school is deliberately 
“deflationary.”3  It holds not only that “academics are not free in any special 
sense to do anything but their jobs,”4 but it also asserts that the value of 
academic freedom should never be explained in terms of “the value of 
academic work in the service it performs for another enterprise.”5  Fish is 
quite emphatic about this latter point: 
 
3  STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 11) (on file with FIU Law Review). 
4  Id. (manuscript at 12). 
5  Id. (manuscript at 54). 
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 Higher education is not valuable because of the benefits some non-
academics might see in it; that’s like valuing the theater or art because 
they bring people into the inner city. Higher education is valuable (if it 
is) because of the particular pleasures it offers to those who are dawn 
to it—chiefly the pleasures of solving puzzles and figuring out what 
makes something what it is—pleasures that would be made 
unavailable or rendered secondary if higher education were regarded 
as the extension of another enterprise. One should not mistake an 
understanding of why something is supported for an understanding of 
what that something is.6 
This point is what distinguishes Fish’s “It’s just a job” school of 
academic freedom from the “for the common good” school of academic 
freedom.  Although the latter also believes that academic freedom exists to 
protect the professional practices of scholars, it makes the mistake of 
attempting to justify academic freedom in terms of social goods like 
democracy or the production of knowledge.  Fish fears that justifying 
academic freedom in terms that are external to the scholarly profession will 
corrupt the profession by bending it to those values. 
Fish seems to me correct to affirm that scholars ought to conduct their 
scholarship according to values that are internal to the practice of 
scholarship.  They ought not to distort their scholarship to pursue alien 
goods.  But it is a non sequitur to fear that justifying academic freedom in 
terms of external goods will corrupt scholarship.  This danger would 
materialize only if the concept of academic freedom were itself an essential 
aspect of the practice of scholarship.  But this does not seem to be the case. 
When academics do their work, they do not typically invoke the 
concept of academic freedom.  The editor of a professional journal who 
believes that the quality of a submission is poor would not be moved to 
accept it for publication by an appeal to the “academic freedom” of the 
author.  The tenure committee which believes that the quality of an 
applicant’s work is inadequate would not be moved to recommend tenure 
by an appeal to the “academic freedom” of a junior colleague.  When 
academics talk to each other about their research, or about the justifications 
for their research, they do not typically use the language of academic 
freedom.  Instead they talk about the competence of the work, as 
determined by the scholarly discipline at issue.7 
 
6 Id. (manuscript at 161). 
7 The concept of academic freedom sometimes does enter into the conversation of scholars in the 
context of evaluating teaching practices.  Academic freedom is traditionally divided into four 
dimensions: freedom of research and publication; freedom of teaching, freedom of extramural speech, 
and freedom of intramural speech.  See FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 1. Each of these 
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Academics do resort to the language of academic freedom, however, 
when they seek to defend their research from external control.  When 
university administrators seek to suppress research because it will alienate 
alumni donors, scholars will defend their work by invoking the value of 
academic freedom.  When members of an outraged public demand the 
suppression of controversial publications, scholars will invoke academic 
freedom as a shield.  When funders or administrators seek to dictate what 
may or may not be taught in the classroom, scholars will defend their 
autonomy by insisting upon the prerogatives of academic freedom. 
Academic freedom, in other words, is primarily a value used by 
scholars to defend the autonomy of the scholarly enterprise.  Scholars rarely 
need to defend this autonomy from each other.  They routinely need to 
defend it from the predations of those who are not scholars. The origins of 
American academic freedom lie in this need. At the outset of the 20th 
Century, scholars like John Dewey, Edwin R.A. Seligman and Arthur O. 
Lovejoy developed the American concept of academic freedom in order to 
prevent university trustees and administrators from seeking to control the 
work of American university professors.8 
These early pioneers believed that the concept of academic freedom 
would persuade those outside the scholarly profession to respect the 
autonomy of the scholarly profession.  This purpose remains the primary 
function of the concept of academic freedom.  The traditional justification 
for academic freedom is that scholars produce knowledge that is valuable to 
society at large, and that scholars can produce this knowledge only if they 
are given the freedom to follow the disciplinary norms that define their 
scholarly enterprise.9  This is precisely the justification for academic 
freedom that lies at the core of what Fish labels the “for common good 
school” of academic freedom.10 
 
dimensions requires its own justification and follows its own logic.  (One of the frustrations of Versions 
of Academic Freedom is that it does not distinguish carefully between these distinct dimensions of 
academic freedom, so that controversies over research are mingled indiscriminately with controversies 
over teaching.)  In this commentary, I focus primarily on freedom of research and publication. I should 
note, however, that occasionally scholars do make claims to each other that sound in academic freedom 
when they seek to justify particular teaching practices.  My guess is that such claims are more common 
in the context of teaching because the disciplinary norms of teaching are far less developed and clear 
than are the disciplinary norms of scholarship.  It is thus more difficult simply to appeal to these norms 
in discussing proper and improper teaching practices.  Nevertheless, because claims of academic 
freedom tend to arise in the context of actual efforts to limit teaching practices, and because 
administrators rather than academics tend to regulate teaching, it is rare to see claims of academic 
freedom made in discussions among scholars about the limits of permissible teaching practices. 
8 See FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 1. 
9 See Tim Scanlon, Academic Freedom and the Control of Research, in THE CONCEPT OF 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM  237-54 (E. L. Pincoffs, ed. 1975). 
10 See FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra note 1. 
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If “academic freedom” is a concept designed to persuade those who 
are outside the scholarly profession, it can be effective only if it is 
convincing to non-scholars.  This means that it must appeal to values that 
are attractive to non-scholars.  By hypothesis these values will be external 
to the academic profession.  There is no logical inconsistency in arguing to 
outsiders that they should respect the autonomy of the academic enterprise 
because that autonomy will produce goods that are valuable to them and to 
society. 
Fish is correct to note, however, that this justification of academic 
freedom is beset with potential tension.  The knowledge desired by society 
at large may not correspond with the knowledge defined and produced by 
the internal disciplinary norms of the academic profession.  A claim of 
academic freedom may for this reason not be effective.  Outsiders may not 
wish to support the goods that academic freedom can produce, which is to 
say the goods that an autonomous scholarly enterprise can provide. The 
possibility of such failure, however, is endemic to making any claim in the 
public space. The purpose of the concept of academic freedom is to 
convince the public to respect the autonomous scholarly enterprise, and, 
conversely, to guide that enterprise in deciding what conditions on public 
support it should and should not accept.11 
II. 
Fish’s rejection of external justifications for academic freedom has 
particularly telling consequences in the context of constitutional law.  
Academic freedom is typically divided into two aspects. The first is keyed 
to the professional organization of higher education; it concerns how 
colleges and universities should organize themselves.  The second involves 
constitutional law; it concerns limitations on state regulations of professors, 
colleges and universities.12  Constitutional limitations are by definition 
justified in terms of constitutional values.  These values turn on public and 
national principles; they do not derive from the internal ideals of the 
scholarly profession.  If academic freedom cannot be justified by values 
external to the scholarly profession, therefore, academic freedom can have 
no relevance to constitutional law. 
The constitutional principle of academic freedom has a long history, 
stretching back at least half a century.  The Supreme Court has 
unequivocally declared that that academic freedom is a “special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
 
11 See Structure, supra note 1. 
12 See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in 
America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (1988). 
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orthodoxy over the classroom.”13  It is not clear why Fish would seek to 
repudiate the very possibility of a constitutional law of academic freedom. 
There is no logical inconsistency in a constitutional principle requiring the 
state to respect the autonomy of the scholarly profession for the state’s own 
(constitutional) reasons. 
I have argued elsewhere that these constitutional reasons should (and 
probably do) include our democracy’s need for the creation and distribution 
of expert knowledge.14  Constitutional protections for the production and 
dissemination of expert knowledge are visible in aspects of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.15 Colleges and universities are the only 
institutions in our society that sustain and reproduce the disciplinary 
standards by which expert knowledge is recognized and certified. 
If this is the justification for the constitutional principle of academic 
freedom, it follows that constitutional law should protect the integrity of 
disciplinary standards. Courts16 and commentators17 currently debate 
 
13 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
14 See DEMOCRACY, supra note 1. 
15 Id. 
16 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (“Academic freedom 
thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, see 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S., at 603; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, (1957) 
(opinion of Warren, C.J.), but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by 
the academy itself, see University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.)”); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A]s this case reveals, the assertion of 
academic freedom of a professor can conflict with the academic freedom of the university to make 
decisions affecting that professor”); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 525, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 
1985) (“[T]hough many decisions describe ‘academic freedom’ as an aspect of the freedom of speech 
that is protected against governmental abridgment by the First Amendment, . . .  the term is equivocal. It 
is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the 
government (the sense in which it used, for example, in Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978), or in our recent decision in EEOC v. 
University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 335-36 (7th Cir.1983)), and the freedom of the 
individual teacher (or in some versions-indeed in most cases-the student) to pursue his ends without 
interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict, as in this case.”); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Case law considering the standard to be applied 
where the issue is academic freedom of the university to be free of governmental interference, as 
opposed to academic freedom of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university 
administration, is surprisingly sparse.”); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F.Supp. 802, 813  (D.C. Ark. 1979) (“The 
present case is particularly difficult because it involves a fundamental tension between the academic 
freedom of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration, and the 
academic freedom of the university to be free of government, including judicial, interference.”). 
17 J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment”, 99 YALE. 
L.J.  251 (1989); J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79 
(2004); Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of Academic 
Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV.  955 (2006); Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom 
vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities, 29 31 J.C. & U.L. 35 (2002); 
Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom or Autonomy Grounded Upon the First Amendment: 
A Jurisprudential Mirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (2007); Matthew Finkin, On “Institutional” Academic 
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whether academic freedom is an individual right that attaches to professors, 
or an institutional right that attaches to universities.  My suggestion is that 
this debate is fundamentally misguided.  Constitutional principles of 
academic freedom protect neither universities nor professors, but instead 
safeguard the disciplinary standards by which expert knowledge is 
recognized and produced.  If a state university, responding to public 
pressure, acts to corrupt these standards by (for example) forbidding 
research on the subject of evolution, professors ought to be able to claim a 
constitutional right of academic freedom to resist the prohibition.  If an 
individual professor attempts to corrupt disciplinary standards by (for 
example) seeking tenure at a state university for incompetent work, 
constitutional academic freedom should protect the decision of the 
university to deny tenure. 
A common legal test used by courts to sketch the parameters of 
constitutional academic freedom is whether a scholar’s speech involves “a 
matter of public concern.”  Fish discusses this test extensively in Versions 
of Academic Freedom.  If the account of constitutional academic freedom I 
have offered is correct, however, this test should be irrelevant.  The origin 
and point of the test is to ascertain the limits of state managerial authority.18  
Every state organization must regulate speech within itself in order to 
accomplish its own goals.  But often such regulation conflicts with the 
ability of employees to participate in public discourse as citizens.  Courts 
developed the “matter of public concern” test to negotiate this tension by 
determining whether a person is speaking as a citizen or as an employee. 
The constitutional value of academic freedom does not turn on the 
distinction between employees and citizens. By hypothesis, freedom of 
research and publication concerns the professional practice of scholars.  
Scholars are hired by universities to engage in research and publication. The 
constitutional principle of academic freedom protects freedom of research 
and publication because the knowledge produced by such research and 
publication is valuable to society, regardless of whether it involves a matter 
of public concern, and regardless of whether a scholar is speaking in the 
 
Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817 (1983); Rachel Fugate, Choppy Waters are Forecast for Academic Free 
Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 187 (1998); Erica Goldberg and Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of 
Difference”: Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 
217-19 (2011); Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom: Protection for Institution 
or Individual?, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 292 (1988); Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Proffesorial Academic 
Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third “Essential Freedom”, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835 (1993); David 
M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First 
Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Summer 1990); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to 
Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006); Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic 
Freedom, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 831, 853-57 (1987). 
18 See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the 
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
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role of a citizen.19 
Because the nature of constitutional academic freedom must be 
determined by reference to the constitutional values that justify it, and 
because these values are by definition external to the scholarly enterprise, 
Fish can strictly say nothing whatever about them.  He must deny them 
from the outset. And this disability undermines Fish’s discussion of the 
constitutional aspects of academic freedom.  It is why Fish’s consideration 
of the “matter of public concern” test is so uncharacteristically 
indeterminate. 
More importantly, it is why Fish’s discussion of Garcetti v. Ceballos20 
is riven with disabling ambivalence.  In that case, the United States 
Supreme Court held “that when public employees make statements pursuant 
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”21  In the secondary school 
context, Garcetti has been interpreted to deny all academic freedom in the 
classroom because a “school system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as 
much as it hires that speech. Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the 
commodity she sells to her employer in exchange for a salary.”22  In the 
context of public universities, some courts have interpreted Garcetti to 
mean that “[i]n order for a public employee to raise a successful First 
Amendment claim, he must have spoken in his capacity as a private citizen 
and not as an employee.”  23 
This conclusion is perverse if the purpose of constitutional academic 
freedom is to protect the production and dissemination of expert 
knowledge. Scholars typically produce and distribute this knowledge in 
their capacity as employees, which is to say as part of what they are hired to 
do. Taken literally, therefore, the conclusion of Garcetti would abolish 
 
19 DEMOCRACY, supra note 1. 
20 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
21 Id. at 421. 
22 Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007).  Yudof observes 
that: “Unless an abridgement of speech lies in every exercise of governmental authority to speak through 
individuals—and how else might abstract entities called governments speak?—it is difficult to 
countenance the view that government control of its own professional speakers violates the historically 
developed concepts of freedom of expression.”  Yudof, supra note 7, at 839. 
23 Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). See, e.g., Capeheart v. Hahs, Slip Copy, 
No. 08CV 1423, 2011 WL 657848 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2011); Isenalumhe v. McDuffie, 697 F. Supp. 2d 
367 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Miller v. Univ. of S. Ala., No. 09-0146-KD-B, 2010 WL 1994910 (S.D. Ala. May 
17, 2010); Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., No. CV-2008-3942-OC, (Idaho 6th Jud. Dist. Dec. 18, 2009).  But 
see Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843-44 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Sheldon v. Bilbir Dhillon, No. C-08-
03438 RMW, 2009 WL 4282086 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009).  See also Adams v. Trustees UNCW, No. 
10-1413 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 2011); Savage v. Gee, 716 F. Supp. 2d 709 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Gorum v. 
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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constitutional academic freedom.  Aware of this possibility, Garcetti itself 
notes that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence,” and it concludes that “[w]e need not, and 
for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would 
apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship 
or teaching.”24 
In his discussion, Fish is uncharacteristically unsure about how to react 
to Garcetti.  Fish believes that academic freedom always only pertains to 
what scholars are employed to do.  On a literal reading of Garcetti, 
therefore, Fish ought to come down against the possibility of constitutional 
academic freedom.  At times, Fish seems to do just this.  He is adamant, for 
example, that there is nothing “exceptional” about academics as employees.  
He devotes Chapter IV of Versions of Academic Freedom to demolishing 
“the ‘Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings’ school” of academic 
freedom, which seeks to ground academic freedom on the thought that 
academics are “uncommon, not only intellectually but morally.”25 He thus 
seems to agree with the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore26 that 
academic freedom does not confer any rights on scholars beyond those to 
which all citizens are already entitled by virtue of the First Amendment.27   
Yet Fish also seems to endorse the conclusion of Professor Judith 
Areen that the research of professors ought to be protected by academic 
freedom whenever they act as educators rather than as (mere) employees.28 
Since professors are hired to be educators, Fish does not unpack the 
meaning of this odd distinction.  The distinction implies that scholars are 
“exceptional” when they act as educators, because they are then entitled to 
constitutional protections that the Constitution withholds from all other 
state employees.  In his discussion of Urofsky, Fish seemed to condemn any 
such “exceptional” treatment of scholars.  But then how can he 
simultaneously endorse Areen’s conclusions? Fish cannot have it both 
ways.   
The root of Fish’s difficulty is that the “exceptional” privilege of 
academic freedom must sound in constitutional values that limit state 
action, and yet Fish’s “It’s just a job” school of academic freedom, with its 
robust refusal to justify academic freedom in terms of any “value of 
 
 24 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
25 FISH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 13). 
 26 217 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
27 FISH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 86). 
28 Id. (manuscript at 103). 
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academic work in the service it performs for another enterprise,”29 would 
seem incapable of theorizing any such values. He is thus left wandering in 
the dark when discussing the constitutional dimensions of academic 
freedom. 
III. 
The primary responsibility of those who, like Fish, adhere to the “It’s 
just a job” school of academic freedom is accurately to identify the nature 
of the job. Because academic freedom consists only in the freedom to do 
the job, it is urgently important to delineate the precise parameters of 
academic work.  
A major thrust of Versions of Academic Freedom is the effort to 
distinguish proper academic work from the political activism that 
occasionally intrudes into university life.  Because professional scholarship 
sometimes involves questions that outside the university are politically 
controversial (e.g., evolution), the distinction between the political and the 
academic is not obvious.  It is important to maintain this distinction, 
however, because academic freedom does not include the freedom to 
politically indoctrinate students or to confuse political activism with 
scholarship.30 There is general agreement that the distinction between 
politics and scholarship can be established only by applying the disciplinary 
norms that define and constitute legitimate scholarship. 
It is thus a question of fundamental significance whether these norms 
are unitary and shared by all scholarly fields, or whether they vary in 
different fields.  In Versions of Academic Freedom, Fish opts for the former 
approach.  He seeks to develop general criteria for separating professional 
scholarship from political agitation, and he believes that these general 
criteria should be applicable to all scholars.  But Fish is vague about the 
content of these criteria. In different parts of the book he describes them in 
different ways. 
Early on Fish implies that academics may not themselves make claims 
of legitimacy, although they may study how claims of legitimacy acquire 
force or authority.  He sharply distinguishes between analyzing how 
“legitimation” is achieved and issuing a judgment about “whether the 
claimed legitimacy is really legitimate.”31 The latter, Fish believes, would 
be political rather than scholarly.  Fish writes, “It is hard to see why 
 
29 Id. (manuscript at 54). 
30 I myself have elsewhere wrestled with this distinction. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Academic 
Freedom and the “Intifada Curriculum”, ACADEME, May-June 2003, at 16; Richard C. Atkinson, 
Academic Freedom and the Research University, 148 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC. 195 (2004). 
31 FISH, supra note 3 (manuscript at 77). 
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academics are the appropriate persons to be” pursing the latter claim, 
“unless academics are regarded as political creatures first and as 
professionals only incidentally.”32  
Sometimes Fish describes the difference between scholarship and 
politics in terms of the distinction between theory and action.  Professional 
scholarship, he writes, is “a realm where contemplation with no end beyond 
itself is mandated and ‘practical activities’ are admitted only as the objects 
of that contemplation.”33 Although scholars may seek truth for its “‘own 
sake’ independently of any call to action,” they must not seek truth “with a 
view to deciding on and implementing policy.”34 At other times Fish 
articulates the difference between politics and scholarship in a slightly 
different way, declaring that academic work involves “an inquiry into the 
intellectual coherence of rules and doctrines; it does not (or should not) 
involve a judgment as to whether those rules and doctrines are morally 
attractive or politically desirable.”35 
Fish evidently believes that certain general criteria distinguish scholars 
who are engaged in an academic enterprise from those who inappropriately 
use their profession as a platform to engage in political activism.  The more 
one considers Fish’s various formulations, however, the more inapplicable 
they seem to many perfectly ordinary scholarly fields. 
So, for example, academic disciplines like political theory routinely 
make first order claims of justification.  They analyze whether claims of 
political legitimacy are “really legitimate.”  It would not be improper for a 
political theorist to take a position on whether the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine is or is not legitimate. 
Other academic disciplines study the world precisely in order to act on 
it.  This is true of practical disciplines, like medicine or dentistry or nursing, 
which study the best ways to intervene in the world to create better 
outcomes.  The research of academic doctors is often directed to new forms 
of action, like new surgical procedures.  Policymaking disciplines (like 
environmental studies) may have a similar structure.  For such disciplines, 
the distinction between theory and action will not divide scholarship from 
politics. 
The distinction between analyzing the intellectual coherence of rules 
and advocating their desirability is not relevant to academic disciplines like 
political philosophy.  Political philosophers characteristically make 
judgments about whether “rules and doctrines are morally attractive or 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (manuscript at 166). 
34 Id. (manuscript at 167). 
35 Id. (manuscript at 166). 
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politically desirable.”  It is the job of political philosophers to determine 
whether a system of rules is morally attractive or desirable.  Law professors 
ordinarily engage in analogous forms of overtly normative reasoning. 
It is clear from this brief survey that the disciplinary norms that 
distinguish scholarship from politics differ from field to field. There is no 
unified set of criteria that can mechanically be applied to all departments of 
a modern university. The criteria that attract Fish may make perfectly good 
sense when describing the difference between politics and scholarship in 
fields like English or comparative literature, but they would make hash of 
many other respectable academic fields.  The lesson is that the scholarly 
profession is complex and variegated, and that someone committed to the 
“It’s just a job” school of academic freedom must pay careful attention to 
the diverse practices of distinct scholarly fields. 
IV. 
It is no false generalization to affirm that Stanley Fish is the most 
vibrant, evocative, and stimulating contemporary voice in the field of 
academic freedom.  His work always repays close attention.  It is filled with 
insights and genius. 
But the great pains that Fish takes to distinguish the “It’s just a job” 
school of academic freedom from the “for the common good” school seem 
to me misplaced.  Both schools believe that the function and content of 
academic freedom is to protect the autonomy of the scholarly enterprise.  
Fish takes a step too far when he argues that academic freedom cannot be 
justified by the values of any enterprise outside of the scholarly profession.  
This conclusion, which he uses to distinguish between the two schools, 
misunderstands the historical and practical function of the concept of 
academic freedom. It threatens entirely to undermine any coherent 
constitutional principle of academic freedom, a possibility that even Fish 
seems unwilling openly to embrace. 
Fish’s primary goal in Versions of Academic Freedom is to distinguish 
legitimate scholarly work from political indoctrination. This is important, 
necessary work.  Academic freedom is not a license to practice politics.36  
But the distinction between politics and scholarship is frequently neither 
clear nor easily discerned.  It requires care and humility, and in particular it 
demands close attention to the actual practices of distinct scholarly 
disciplines. 
 
 
36 There may be an exception to this generalization in the context of freedom of extramural 
speech. The possible justifications for this exception are explored in FOR THE COMMON GOOD, supra 
note 1. 
